The United States after unipolarity: the United States and international economic governance by Joyce, Joseph P.
  
Joseph P. Joyce 
The United States after unipolarity:  the 
United States and international economic 
governance 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Joyce, Joseph P. (2011) The United States after unipolarity: the United States and international 
economic governance. IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR009. LSE 
IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43477/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
© 2012 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
24
The United States 
and International Economic 
Governance
Joseph P. Joyce
Among the unexpected outcomes of the global financial crisis of 2008-9 has been the end of the domination of international economic governance by the U.S.US and other upper-
income countries through the forum of the G7, and its replacement by the G20. The depth and 
breadth of the economic contraction required a broader response than the advanced economies 
alone could provide, and its origin in financial markets in the United States undermined its 
support for neoliberal policies. Now that the global crisis has passed, the G20 must demonstrate 
whether it can serve as an effective forum for monitoring and managing the global economy. 
 
RISE OF THE G7
When the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and controlled capital flows ended in 1973, 
the United States brought together France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and later Japan and Italy, 
to discuss its replacement. The national executives of these countries held their first summit meeting 
in Rambouillet, France in 1975 to address the impasse that had developed over how the IMF’s Articles 
of Agreement should be amended. The compromise they reached allowed nations to choose the 
exchange rate regime they wanted (the goal of the United States) while committing the IMF’s members 
to pursuing policies aimed at economic stability (France’s concern), with the IMF providing surveillance 
of its members’ policy performance. The agreement became the basis of the Second Amendment to 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement that was adopted in 1978. 
This group of nations, which became known as the G7 after Canada joined it in 1976, would 
continue to manage international economic issues during the next thirty years. The finance ministers 
of the G7 met several times a year to discuss common interests while deputies stayed in contact 
between meetings. They also prepared for the annual summits of their national executives, who 
issued communiqués which detailed their policy agendas and listed instructions for the multilateral 
agencies. While the issues they addressed soon expanded outside of the economics sphere to include 
foreign policy matters, economics would remain a primary focus, in part because of the leading 
role of the finance ministers. In 1997, the G7 expanded to include Russia as a member of the new 
G8. But the finance ministers of the G7 continued to meet as a group, and the G7 national leaders 
continued to deal collectively with economic issues, such as debt relief, for the developing economies. 
 
The G7 governments were able to act cohesively in part because they shared common views and 
interests. The West European nations opposed central planning and the expansion of the Soviet Union 
and its Eastern European satellites. Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom were members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while France established a working relationship with 
the organization. In Asia, Japan depended on the United States to protect it from aggression. 
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While there were disagreements among the 
G7 countries over issues such as exchange rate 
arrangements, their common interests more than 
outweighed any differences.
The influence of the G7 extended to multilateral 
organisations such as the IMF. Before 2008, the United 
States held 17.38% of the quota shares that are used 
to calculate voting power at the IMF, thus effectively 
giving it a veto over proposals that required approval 
of 85% of the total voting power. The G7 nations 
collectively held 46.02% of the total. Representatives 
of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom held positions for their respective 
countries on the Fund’s Executive Board, while the 
Canadian and Italian Directors represented multi-
country constituencies. Moreover, the agreement 
of the United States and their European allies that 
the Managing Director of the IMF would always be 
a European while the United States would name the 
head of the World Bank continued to hold.
The ability of the upper-income countries to dominate 
the IMF was reinforced by the change in the clientele 
of the IMF’s lending programs after the 1970s. The 
advanced economies no longer borrowed from the 
IMF, and the IMF’s traditional lending programs became 
concentrated on those middle-income nations that 
experienced financial crises. The IMF also lent, on 
concessional terms, to the poorest nations that 
received relatively little private finance, augmenting 
the World Bank’s remit. The advanced economies, 
exempt from the conditions attached to the IMF’s 
loans, endorsed the adoption by the IMF and the 
World Bank of a new form of conditionality, ‘structural 
conditionality’. These were measures that sought to 
increase a country’s reliance on the market allocation of 
resources by cutting back on governmental enterprises 
and regulations, and opening the economy to 
international trade and financial flows. 
The G7 also effectively controlled international financial 
regulation through their membership with other 
advanced economies in the Bank for International 
Settlements and its affiliated agencies, such as the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. In 1988, 
following an initiative by the United Kingdom and 
the United States, the Basel Committee established 
a standard of capital requirements for the banks of its 
member countries, which were eventually adopted in 
many other countries. Similarly, the Basel Concordats 
of 1975 and 1983 established rules for the oversight 
by national regulators of banks that operated across 
borders. The regulators had allowed their banks to 
expand geographically, but subsequent banking crises 
revealed a lack of transnational regulatory authority. 
The G7 countries had similar influence at the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and 
its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Negotiations over trade liberalisation were dominated 
by the ‘Quad’ – Canada, the European Union, Japan, 
and the United States. Their representatives met in 
‘rounds’ to negotiate cuts in tariffs while keeping some 
sectors, such as agriculture, off the agenda. Those 
nations that did not have significantly sized markets, 
which included most developing economies, were able 
to opt out of the process. This allowed the Quad and 
other advanced economies to make deals without the 
participation of the developing economies.
The G7 and other countries expanded the scope 
of trade talks with the Uruguay Round, which was 
negotiated from 1986 through 1993. The final 
agreement established the World Trade Organisation 
as the GATT’s replacement, and included services and 
intellectual property as areas of jurisdiction. In addition, 
an administrative process to resolve disputes between 
members was created. The new regime embodied 
a broad view of the scope of the WTO’s purview to 
include any domestic policies that might impede trade. 
By the early 1990s the United States had emerged as 
the winner of the Cold War, and appeared to have 
an unchallenged hegemonic dominance. It and other 
upper-income countries were able to promulgate 
an expansive vision of economic globalisation. The 
members of the G7 formed a collective principal that 
utilised the multilateral organisations as their agents to 
implement this vision. The G7’s restricted membership 
and relatively homogeneous views allowed them to 
operate effectively despite occasional disagreements. 
They were also aided by the disappearance of 
communism as a viable alternative to capitalism, 
and the adoption by many developing economies of 
market-based policies to accelerate growth.
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CRISES AND CHALLENGES
The domination of the global economy by the United 
States and other G7 countries, and their use of the 
multilateral agencies, became increasingly controversial 
in the latter half of the 1990s. A series of financial 
crises occurred: Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia in 1997-
98, Russia in 1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2001. 
The IMF provided financial assistance to the crisis 
countries, but the conditions attached to the IMF’s 
loans were criticised as overly strict. Moreover, the 
IMF itself was blamed by some for contributing to the 
occurrence of the crises by urging these countries to 
prematurely decontrol capital flows.
The G7 responded to the resultant volatility in the 
international financial markets by establishing a new 
organisation, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF). 
The membership of the FSF included the G7 plus 
Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Singapore, 
and Switzerland. The FSF brought together finance 
ministries, central bankers, and other regulators to 
coordinate their oversight of financial flows and 
institutions, but the organisation had no independent 
powers to administer regulatory guidelines. 
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
published in 2004 a revised and extended set of 
minimum requirements for bank capital, known as 
Basel II. The new standards allowed banks to choose 
the methodology they used to calculate their exposure 
to credit risk, and the options included the use of 
internal evaluation models, as well as a standardised 
approach based on the ratings generated by the 
rating agencies. The choice of methodology favoured 
larger banks in the advanced economies that had the 
resources to calculate risk exposure. Subsequent events 
revealed that the guidelines contributed to the volatility 
of the financial system by underestimating the risk of 
financial assets such as mortgage-backed securities. 
Many of the middle-income countries, which were 
now called the ‘emerging market’ nations due to their 
rapid economic expansion, sought to eliminate any 
dependence on the IMF by ‘self-insuring’ themselves 
from future financial shocks. Their governments 
adopted stable macroeconomic policies that led 
to lower inflation and improved fiscal and debt 
positions. They also recorded current account surpluses 
which allowed their central banks to accumulate 
large holdings of foreign exchange reserves. These 
surpluses were offset by current account deficits in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and several 
other advanced economies. The growing magnitude 
of these ‘global imbalances’ was accompanied by fears 
of a sudden reversal of capital flows to the United 
States by foreign investors. The IMF sought to broker 
a reduction of the imbalances through multilateral 
consultations it organised in 2006-07 with China, 
the Eurozone, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
States, but the talks did not result in changes in any 
of the participants’ policies.
The G7 also faced a challenge to their authority 
as a result of the WTO negotiations. After the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, 
discussions of a follow-up round of trade negotiations 
began. The new round was to be launched at a WTO 
ministerial conference in 1999, but ministers from the 
developing countries opposed efforts to expand the 
talks to include areas such as the environment and 
labour standards. The meeting in Seattle collapsed 
without attaining a consensus over how to proceed, 
and was marred by street riots denouncing the WTO 
and policies aimed at promoting   globalisation at the 
cost of national sovereignty. 
The next WTO ministerial meeting took place in 2001 
in Doha, Qatar, and this time the ministers agreed 
on the inauguration of a new round of trade talks. 
This was known as the ‘Doha Development Round’ 
in acknowledgement of the need to extend the 
benefits of trade to developing nations. However, 
there have been continuing disagreements between 
advanced economies and the emerging market and 
developing nations, as well as within each group. 
Agriculture has been a particular source of discord. 
The United States and the European Union have 
disagreed over reductions in their agricultural subsidies, 
while developing nations with large rural populations 
such as India have resisted the removal of barriers to 
agricultural imports.
The authority of the United States, therefore, 
became challenged on several fronts during the 
decades of the 1990s and 2000s. The response of 
the emerging markets countries to the endemic 
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financial crises demonstrated that they would take their own measures to protect themselves from further 
financial volatility. The rapid growth of China and India demonstrated that it was possible to achieve 
rapid growth and alleviate poverty by implementing national strategies to control the pace and degree of 
integration with international markets. The governance of the multilateral organisations came under attack as 
unresponsive to the changes in the relative economic status of their members, and the increasingly confident 
emerging markets felt no reluctance in criticising the form of globalisation endorsed by these organisations. 
IMPLOSION
The worldwide economic collapse that occurred during 2008-9 destroyed any illusions that the advanced 
economies were immune from crises. This crisis originated in the United States but also included the financial 
sectors of other advanced economies in Europe. The loss in confidence in financial institutions and markets 
necessitated government intervention in the form of low interest rates, capital injections, deposit guarantees, 
and other measures designed to maintain confidence. The emerging market and other developing economies 
were not immune to the ensuing contraction in trade and capital flows, and suffered slowdowns in their 
growth rates. The volume of world trade in goods and services fell by 10.7% in 2009, and world output 
contracted by 0.7%. 
But the latter figure encompassed a range of different experiences (see Chart 1). While the output of 
the advanced economies fell by 3.7%, economic growth continued in the emerging and developing economies, 
albeit at a slower pace of 2.8%. This disparity in economic performance was particularly evident in the world’s 
largest economies. Output in the United States contracted by 3.7% in 2009, while the Eurozone’s output 
suffered a fall of 4.3%. Economic activity in China, on the other hand, barely slackened and registered an 
impressive growth of 9.2%, while India’s economy expanded by 6.8%.
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Chart 1: Percentage growth rates of Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000-2012. Data for 2011 and 2012 are 
estimates.  Data from IMF’s World Economic Outlook, September 2011.
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The global impact of the crisis required a broader 
response than the G7 could provide. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown led the way in calling for a meeting of the G20 
in the fall of 2008. In addition to the G7 countries, 
this group includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the European Union. 
The group had been established in 1999 to expand the 
discussion of economic and financial issues to include 
emerging market nations that attracted capital inflows, 
but it had never conducted a summit of their national 
executives. However, the G20’s existing structure and 
record of cooperation among its members allowed it 
to serve as an alternative to the G7. 
The first summit meeting of the G20 leaders took 
place in Washington, DC, in November 2008 during 
the closing days of the Bush administration, and did 
not yield any initiatives beyond agreeing to address the 
common crisis and undertake reforms of their financial 
sectors. H owever, United States President-elect Barak 
Obama attended the next summit in London in April 
2009, and this time the national leaders agreed on 
a number of important measures, including the 
implementation of concerted fiscal and monetary 
expansionary policies. They also approved tripling the 
financial resources of the IMF, and transformed the 
Financial Stability Forum to the Financial Stability Board 
with an expanded membership of all G20 countries 
as well as Spain and the European Commission. In 
addition, the G20 leaders agreed on a package of IMF 
reforms, including quota realignments, the selection 
of the senior leadership of the international financial 
institutions through an open merit-based process, 
and ‘candid, even-handed and independent’ IMF 
surveillance of their economies.
When the G20 leaders met again in September 2009 
in Pittsburgh, United States, they declared victory in 
their efforts to end the global economic contraction. 
The leaders reaffirmed their support of the IMF and 
the new Financial Stability Board, and designated 
their own group as the ‘premier forum for our 
international economic cooperation’. They called for 
international financial regulatory reform, including 
changes in the Basel capital standards. Finally, the 
national leaders promised to bring the Doha Round 
to a successful conclusion and to reach agreement 
at the climate summit scheduled to take place in 
Copenhagen. The meeting confirmed that the crisis had 
served as a catalysis for a major rearrangement of the 
relative position of the advanced and emerging market 
economies, with the latter group achieving parity with 
the former in their oversight of the world economy. 
CONCLUSIONS
The unity of purpose expressed at the first three 
G20 summits has not endured. By the time of the 
G20 summit in Toronto in June 2010, divisions had 
emerged over whether deficit spending was still an 
appropriate policy. At the fifth G20 conference in 
Seoul in November 2010 there were disagreements 
over the use of numerical indicators in assessments of 
national economic policies, while the lastmost recent 
summit in Cannes was dominated by discussion of the 
European debt crisis. No progress has been made at 
the Doha trade talks, and the climate conference in 
Copenhagen in December 2009 ended without any 
substantive agreements.
Some progress has occurred in other arenas. The 
IMF agreed on a redistribution of quota shares that 
will make China the third largest quota-holder, 
and increased the allocations to other emerging 
market nations. However, its members missed an 
opportunity to geographically open up the selection 
of a Managing Director when they elected France’s 
Christine Lagarde to the position to replace Dominque 
Strauss-Kahn after his unexpected resignation. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has, with 
an expanded membership, proposed a new set of 
regulatory guidelines with higher capital requirements 
for banks, to be known as Basel III. 
The prospects for the G20 actually replacing the G7 
as a mechanism to deal with common concerns, 
however, are limited by the disparities in national 
economic performance. Economic growth for the 
advanced economies has been estimated by the 
IMF at 1.6% in 2011 and 1.9% for the following 
year, and the European estimates for the European 
market may prove to be optimistic. The comparable 
figures for the emerging market and developing 
economies are 6.4% and 6.1%, respectively. 
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The European countries have become embroiled in the debt crisis that includes Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, 
and threats to envelop Spain and Italy. The United States itself faces deep domestic divisions over the need 
to reduce its government debt while dealing with unusually high unemployment rates. Moreover, virtually 
all the advanced economies must address fiscal challenges due to the impact of aging populations on the 
costs of pension support and health care. 
The G20 is useful for providing a forum for consultations, but the size of its membership and the disparity in 
their economic circumstances makes consensus much harder to attain. This need not bring about economic 
anarchy; governments have generally been careful not to enact trade restrictions or currency depreciations 
which would invite retaliation. But the lack of a common outlook and goals (‘preference heterogeneity’) 
among the members makes collective decision difficult to achieve. 
The United States no longer has the will or means to dominate international economic governance, but there 
is no clear replacement. The prospects, therefore, are for an extended period of lower level accords, with 
bilateral and regional trade agreements and currency arrangements replacing international pacts. An era of 
multipolarity will effectively continue the status quo that preceded the global crisis of 2008-9. There is no 
evidence that we are better able to foresee and avoid another shock, and given the concerns over national 
debt levels, the policy options for dealing with a new disaster will be more limited should another shock arise.■
 
 
